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scenarios for limiting warming below 2 °C. The stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at
low levels requires a large-scale transformation of the energy system. Depending on policy
choices, there are alternative pathways to reach this objective. An “optimal” path, as emerging
from energy-economic modeling, implies immediate action with stringent emission reductions,
while the currently proposed international policies translate into reduction delays and higher
near-term emissions. In our delayed action scenarios, low stabilization levels need thus to be
reached from comparatively high 2030 emission levels. Negative consequences are higher
economic cost as explored in accompanying papers and significantly higher mid-term warming,
as indicated by a rate of warming 50% higher by the 2040s. By contrast, both mid- and long-term
warming are significantly higher in another class of scenarios of staged accession that lets some
regions embark on emission reductions, while others follow later, with conservation of carbon-
price pathways comparable to the optimal scenarios. Not only is mid-term warming higher in
staged accession cases, but the probability to exceed 2 °C in the 21st century increases by a factor
of 1.5.
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Greenhouse-gas emission scenarios are an important tool to
provide coherent storylines exploring the options and costs of
realizing mid- to long-term climate-change mitigation goals. A
prominent method for developing such scenarios is the use of
integrated assessment models (IAMs). These models show a
large diversity in approaches that lead to differences in coveragestr 231, Haus B, 10969
.org (M. Schaeffer).
uthors. Published by Elseviof geographical regions, sectors, greenhouse gases and pollut-
ants, as well as structural differences that relate to economic
feedback mechanisms.
Many of these models also include simple representations of
the physical climate system, to be able to optimize emission
pathways for achieving long-term climate goals. This special
issue presents the results from the AMPERE project, involving a
large number of IAMs aimed at limiting total greenhouse-gas
emissions to achieve a set of standardized CO2 emission budgets.
Different models achieve these budgets by means of different
time-dependent emissionpathways. Given (a) thewide range of
approaches for estimating first-order climate-system responseer Inc. This is an open access article under the CC-BY-NC-ND license
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differences in the time-dependent emission pathways pro-
duced by the IAMs, the consequences of mitigation policy cases
and technological options for long-term climate goals are not
immediately clear and comparable across IAMs.
Therefore, in this paper the emission scenarios developed
by IAM groups within the AMPERE project are assessed in a
common climate-modeling framework. This allows us to provide
a context of mid- to long-term projections of greenhouse-gas
concentrations and warming for evaluation of the mitigation
scenarios.
The AMPERE project has some unique features compared
to previous IAM intercomparisons that make it particularly
interesting for an in-depth analysis of the climate response
to anthropogenic emissions. AMPERE focused on scenario
variants that deviate from the idealized assumption of immedi-
ate full cooperative action onmeeting a stabilization target. First,
it explored a delayed action situation where moderate levels of
mitigation stringency are aimed for in the short term (2030) and
the long term target is only adopted thereafter [2]. Secondly, it
studied staged accession to a global climate regime, where some
regions join the global climate mitigation effort at later times
than others [3]. The two scenario sets allow to explore strong
peak and decline emission scenarios, as well as the loss of
mitigation stringency due to staged accession of key emitting
countries. These types of scenarios are highly policy relevant and
at the same time sufficiently different from the standard set of
representative concentration pathways (RCPs — see [2]) that
have been investigated by a suite of climate models [4,5]. For
example, the AMPERE scenarios with moderate near-term
mitigation policies lead to a pronounced “emissions gap”
over the next twodecades compared to immediate and optimal
climate policy scenarios, which have been the focus of the vast
majority of scenarios in the past. As shown by single-model
studies [6–8] and with a large suite of models by Riahi et al.
[9] in this special issue, many IAM models suggest that low
long-term targets compatible with 2 °C temperature change
can still be reached from relatively higher near-term emissions.
The transient temperature consequences of this near-term
emissions gap have, however, only been explored to a limited
degree [6,7]. This is thus a key issue that will be addressed in
this paper.
As a further original contribution to the literature, the paper
draws on two different approaches to explore the climate
outcome of the IAM emission scenarios. One approach uses
the simple coupled carbon-cycle/climate model MAGICC6 that
generates probabilistic information [10] about the climate
response. The second approach uses a step function emulation of
CMIP5 [5] general circulationmodels to deduce the temperature
response to the forcing projections generated by MAGICC6. The
comparison of the two approaches delivers two insights that are
new to the literature. It shows how the climate outcomes from
an approximation of the latest round of climatemodel ensemble
runs relate to the temperature estimates from MAGICC6, and to
this end the IAMswhich often rely on this type of simple climate
models to explore climate consequences ofmitigation pathways.
The AMPERE project adopted cumulative CO2 emission
budgets as long-term targets (including CO2 equivalent pricing
of non-CO2 emissions) while earlier studies mostly focused on
a variety of greenhouse gas stabilization targets. This leads to a
better harmonization of cumulative greenhouse-gas emissionsacross model scenarios and allows to explore the range of
climate outcomes that can emerge from emission budgets.
Drawing from the AMPERE scenario exercises, we will
analyze four key variants of “default” mitigation scenarios to
explore how sensitive mid- to long-term projections are to:
• An extrapolation of the current level of mitigation ambition
over the 21st century, without new policies required, for
example, for achieving presently proposed Copenhagen
Pledges and emission targets under the Cancun Agreement
[3,9].
• Concerted immediate action to meet the long term CO2
budget in an economically efficient way [3,9]. This and the
first scenario serve as benchmark cases.
• Concerted, butweak action broadly consistentwith presently
proposed Copenhagen Pledges and the Cancun Agreement,
leading to relatively high emission levels by 2030 [9].
• Fragmented participation of country groups, including cases
of Europe and China taking early mitigation action, followed
later by other regions, or not at all [3].
Additional scenario variants [9] represen technology
sensitivity cases that assume limited potential for biomass
(maximum of 100 EJ/yr), exploring strategies thatwould avoid
large-scale expansion of bioenergy and thus avoid potential
competition over land for food and fiber. These sensitivity cases
(LimBio) are very relevant also for the emission pathways,
since they limit the potential for negative emissions from
Bio-CCS that can possibly compensate in the long term for
overshoots of near-term emission targets or budgets, thus
inhibiting such near-term overshoots.
2. Methods
2.1. Multi-gas scenarios
Five of the 12 Integrated Assessment Models included in
the AMPERE comparison were able to directly provide all the
greenhouse gases and air pollutants (see Table 1) required as
input for the coupled carbon-cycle/climate model MAGICC6
(see Section 2.3). For other IAMs, a protocol was developed
to supplement scenarios with “missing” emission species or
categories, to enable climate projections and intercomparison
across all models and scenarios:
• If CO2 from land use was not reported, the mean across the
RCP scenarios [2,11] for each time step was added
• If SOx was not reported, emissions were derived using an
average relation between CO2 emissions from the fossil-fuels
& industry sectors and SOx emissions across the “full-gas”
models (see Supplementary information)
• For other unreported species and given the weaker correla-
tion with CO2 emissions compared to SOx, the time series
was inserted from the same scenario produced by MESSAGE,
for no reason other than the completeness of coverage of
AMPERE scenarios by that model
• For any other gas or sector that was not reported, for each
time step emissions were derived by interpolation between
the lowest and highest RCP emission scenarios RCP3PD and
RCP8.5, using CO2 emissions from energy and industry as
interpolation key.
Table 1
Gases (and sectors) reported in the emission scenarios produced by IAMs in
this paper.
IAM name CO2 fossil
fuels &
industry
CO2
land
use
CH4 N2O F-gas SOx BC
OC
CO NOx
DNE21a × × × × × × × × ×
GCAM × × × × × × × × ×
GEMa × × × ×
IMACLIM ×
IMAGE × × × × × × × × ×
MERGE-ETL × × × × × ×
MESSAGE × × × × × × × × ×
POLES × ×b × ×
REMIND × × × × × × × × ×
WITCH × × × × ×
WorldScana × × × ×
a Over 2005–2050.
b Excluding land use.
259M. Schaeffer et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 257–2682.2. Harmonization (RCP approach)
As highlighted by Rogelj et al. [12] deviation of simulated
present-day emissions from (global) inventories might have
a significant effect on future climate projections. To minimize
this effect, all AMPERE emission scenarios were harmonized
to RCP levels in year 2005 for each species separately. The
harmonization factors decline linearly to unity in 2050 to
preserve asmuch as possible the character ofmost IAMscenarios
that aim at a pre-defined radiative forcing level in 2100. The
same method was used for the RCPs, see Meinshausen et al. [4]
and van Vuuren et al. [2].
2.3. Climate-model projections of concentrations, radiative forcing
and warming
We first used a simple coupled carbon-cycle/climate model
(MAGICC6 — [13]) for deriving pathways of greenhouse-gas
concentrations and radiative forcing for each of the IAMemission
scenarios, for all Kyoto1 greenhouse gases and pollutants,
including SOx, Black Carbon, Organic Carbon and co-emitted
substances.
The implications for future changes in global-mean surface-
air temperature were analyzed for each of the scenarios through
two independent methods. In the first method, calculations of
concentrations and forcing are integrated in MAGICC6 to drive
projections of warming. The model setup allows to derive a
best-estimate and probability distribution for each of these
variables, by running MAGICC6 600 times with different
parameter sets for each emission scenario [15]. Parameter sets
were drawn randomly that allow the model to reproduce a
series of observed time series of climate variables in terms of
the overall median and uncertainty ranges, while the overall
probability distribution of climate sensitivity is consistent with1 Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Fluorinated
gases (F-gases: HFCs, PFCs, SF6), and NH3. As of December 2012 NF3 is
included in the “Kyoto basket” of gases, but not in the models in this study.
Current contributions to global warming are insigniﬁcant, but considerable
emission growth is projected [14] S.A. Montzka, E.J. Dlugokencky, J.H. Butler,
Non-CO2 greenhouse gases and climate change, Nature, 476 (2011) 43–50.
Not including this gas in the emission pathways implies implicitly that
(future) controls to limit emissions of NF3 are effective.IPCCAR4 [10], with amedian estimate of 3 °C and a 76% chance
of a value between 2 and 4.5 °C.
The results of climate projections in this paper are presented
as:
• Single-model/single emission scenario projections: the
medians and 66% ranges across the ensemble members of
individual IAM scenarios.
• Multi-model/single emission scenario projections: overall-
medians and 66% ranges across all ensemble members from
all IAM realization of the same emission scenario.
The secondmethod attempts to include global-mean surface-
air temperature estimates fromglobal climatemodels (GCMs)by
providing emulations using the step response simple climate
model (SCM) of Good et al. [16] as a proxy. This method has
shown to give good agreement between the SCM and the GCM
for global projections [16]. The advantages of this method lie in
its simplicity and the use of GCM data, which allows traceability
of the results directly back to the GCMs. The median radiative
forcing projections from MAGICC6 were used by the SCM to
provide temperature rise emulations for 17 different GCMs that
took part in the CoupleModel Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) and from
which a GCM model average is derived. As explained in the
Supplementary information it was not possible to include all
CMIP5GCMs in the emulations. The subset of 17GCMs used here
is somewhat more sensitive to forcing compared to the full
CMIP5 means, typically leading to a roughly 0.2 °C higher
warming by 2080–2099 for RCP scenarios.
2.4. Integrated assessment model scenarios
As indicated above, the scenarios presented in this paper
vary along three key dimensions, i.e. the climate target, the
degree of delay in combination with technology constraints
and the level of participation.
AMPERE adopted two climate targets that are broadly
consistent with achieving atmospheric GHG concentration
levels at 450 and 550 ppm CO2eq. Participating modeling teams
were not requested to directly implement GHG stabilization
targets corresponding to radiative forcings of 2.6 W/m2 and
3.7 W/m2 in 2100, because not all models represent the full
basket of greenhouse gases and other radiative agents like
aerosols and their associated forcing. To harmonize targets
between models and to remove uncertainties in translating
forcing levels into GHG emissions, models were constrained by
cumulative CO2 budgets for the 21st century of 1500 GtCO2 and
2400 GtCO2 for the 450 and 550 ppm CO2eq targets, respec-
tively,2 given the strong link between long-term cumulative
emission budgets and climate projections [15,17]. Although the
global budgets apply to CO2 only, models were asked to apply
the emerging CO2 price to other Kyoto gases represented in the
model. Models are given full temporal flexibility for keeping
emissions within the respective budgets. This can lead to
overshooting the emission budgets followed by compensation
later, and hence overshooting of the associated radiative forcing
target prior to 2100.2 A few models do not include emissions from land-use changes. For these
models, cumulative fossil-fuel-related CO2 emission budgets were pre-
scribed as 1400 and 2400, respectively, based on the mean correlation of
these budgets of models that do include land-use emissions.
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accession, ran a no climate policy baseline (Base-FullTech-OPT
and AM3-Base) that differed only for a few models that did
not harmonize final energy in the staged accession experiments.
Emission results are drawn from the same set of models in the
two sets of experiments, with 2 additional models adding to
the collection of staged accession scenarios. The two sets of
experiments included the same climate policy benchmark
scenarioswith full flexibility of emission reductions and identical
targets (450/550-FullTech-OPT and 450/550 immediate action).
The staged accession experiments also included technology
targets until 2020 in these benchmark scenarios, but their
impact on climate outcomes is negligible.
The two sets of experiments differed in the type of the
scenarios that deviated from the benchmark climate policy
cases. The first of these two sets, on delayed action (see [9]),
explored the consequences of weak near-term climate policies,
by considering a combination of different short-term and
long-term targets, which divide the century-scale time horizon
of the scenarios into two stages. During the first stage up to the
year 2030, global emissions are required to follow a trajectory
toward a 2030 emission target. After 2030, emissions are
constrained further to stay within a cumulative emission budget
for the full century (2000–2100) in order to achieve stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the long-term. In this set-up,
the amount of cumulative emissions that may be vented to the
atmosphere in the second stage (after 2030) will critically
depend on the short-term emission pathway to 2030. The
distinct separation of the time-frames helped in the AMPERE
project to explicitly assess the consequences of actions over the
short-term for the attainability and costs of long term objectives
[9]. In this paper we focus in addition on the critical question of
the climate response of the weak short-term targets.
We distinguish between low and high short-term targets. In
our “Low” short-term target, annual greenhouse gas emissions
stay close to present levels [18] of around 51 GtCO2e/yr until
2020 and reach 53 GtCO2e/yr by 2030. Emissions in the “High”
short-term target are around 55 GtCO2e/yr in 2020, and
increase to 61 GtCO2e/yr by 2030. These levels are significantly
above the emission levels from optimal policy scenarios
that aim at low stabilization levels (e.g., 450 ppm CO2eq,
[19]).
Our second set of experiments, on staged accession scenarios
[3], considered a reference climate policy casewhere countries are
locked into their current level of action throughout the 21st
century. The 2020 emission targets are mostly based on the
unconditional Copenhagen Pledges of countries [3,20]. Post-
2020, regions are assumed to continuewith emission reductions
that sustain their average emission intensity improvements at
a rate that is roughly consistent with their pre-2020 action. The
reference policy was used to formulate a staged accession
scenario in which only the EU took more ambitious climate
action early on, while the others followed the reference policy
until 2030. After 2030, both the EU and the rest of the world
transitioned to the carbon price trajectory that emerges in the
450 ppm benchmark policy until 2050. However, due to the
excess emissions in the first half of the century, this carbon
pricing policywill no longer achieve the concentration target in
the benchmark. Thus, the staged accession scenarios allow to
study the risk of not achieving the climate target due to delayed
action early in the century.3. Results
Although the impacts of climate change are driven by
regional and local patterns, many of these roughly scale with
global-mean indicators like greenhouse-gas concentrations
and warming. This is one reason why long-term climate goals
in both the scientific literature [21] and the policy debate [22]
are often framed in terms of global-mean values. In this
section we analyze the emission scenarios in terms of several
global-mean climate indicators. For the figures presented in
this paper, the ranges reflect the differences in IAM emission
results, combined with our estimates of uncertainty in carbon-
cycle and climate parameters.
3.1. CO2 concentration
CO2 emissions are a prime output variable of all IAMs and
the resulting elevated atmospheric CO2 concentration is the
major determinant of projected global warming, certainly on
the long-term. Elevated CO2 concentrations also affect the
environment directly, for example by driving ocean acidification
(threatening e.g. coral reefs, shellfish and some plankton species
[23]) and CO2-fertilization of terrestrial vegetation. Due to the
long residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere, concentrations
by 2100 are a good indicator to compare overall impacts
between scenarios over the 21st century, as well as post-2100
commitment.
In the baseline scenarios (Fig. 1a), CO2 concentrations
increase from present-day values around 400 ppm to a range
of about 800–1100 ppm by 2100. The average value across the
models is 900 ppm. Although the reference policy pathway,
representing an extrapolation of current climate policies, brings
down CO2 concentrations considerably, by 2100 these are still
much higher than today and increasing. The graph also shows
the emission profiles resulting from the 450 and 550 ppm
CO2eq mitigation scenarios. The scenarios lead to much lower
CO2 concentration, as well as declining concentrations by the
end of the century.
A typical feature of the staged accession scenarios (Fig. 1b)
is that these lead to concentrations that stay significantly
higher than the immediate action, or optimal scenarios. The
lower long-term target of 450 ppm is more sensitive in this
respect and staged accession leads to median concentrations
higher by as much as a standard deviation distance above the
median of the immediate action realizations and close to the
550 scenarios until the 2050s.
Given that the optimal 450 scenarios achieve a lower
emissions and concentration level in the early decades of the
21st century than other scenarios, the 450 delayed action
scenarios are obviously also more sensitive than the 550
scenarios to emission levels being too high around 2030 (Fig. 1c
& d). However, post-2030 mitigation measures seem effective
in bringing down concentrations to levels close to the optimal
scenarios by 2100.
Limiting the potential for global net-negative emissions
provided by combining modern-biomass energy systems with
carbon capture and storage requires earlier CO2 emission
reductions, hence leads to lower CO2 concentrations in early
decades. Even in these scenarios, however, end-of-century
concentrations converge with the optimal scenario, al-
though the rate of decline is lower by that time.
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Fig. 1. CO2 concentration projections resulting from IAM emission scenarios as calculated with MAGICC6. Panel a) Baselines and weak policy scenarios as well as
all scenarios shown in the other panels for illustration; panel b) staged accession mitigation scenarios; panel c) 550 ppm CO2eq with delayed-action variants; and
panel d) 450 ppm CO2eq with delayed-action variants. Lines indicate median estimates across all MAGICC6 ensemble members for all IAM realizations of the
same scenario. Shaded area shows 66% uncertainty range around the median over all available models for only one scenario per panel, including both uncertainty
resulting from carbon-cycle/climate modeling (MAGICC6) and energy-economic modeling (IAMs). Results through 2050 include more IAM realizations per
scenario than results post-2050, which results in discontinuities of statistics in 2050. Note different y-axis in panel a).
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The climate response is determined not only by CO2, but
also by non-CO2 greenhouse gases and air pollutants,
including those that lead to aerosols like sulfate and black
carbon. In the climate model MAGICC6 emissions of CO2 and
all other greenhouse gases from the IAMs give rise to
separately calculated changes in concentrations of these
greenhouse gases. In addition, IAM-provided emissions of
air pollutants either (a) influence atmospheric chemistry
that leads to tropospheric-ozone formation and changes in the
lifetime – and hence concentration – of methane, or (b) lead to
tropospheric aerosols like sulfates, black carbon and organic
carbon, with a cooling or warming effect on climate. The
total effect of anthropogenic emissions on the climate is
expressed here as CO2-equivalent concentrations, i.e. the
CO2 concentration that at a givenmoment in timewould result
in the same radiative forcing as that of all greenhouse-gases
and aerosols in the model combined. Since non-CO2 species
generally have much shorter residence times than CO2, peak
value of CO2eq concentration over the 21st century is a relevant
indicator in addition to the level by 2100.
At present, the CO2 and CO2-equivalent concentrations are
about equal, due to mutually compensating effects of non-CO2
greenhouse gases and (cooling) aerosols. In the baseline
scenarios (Fig. 2a), equivalent-CO2 concentrations increase to
roughly 1100 ppm by 2100, about 200 ppm higher than CO2concentrations. This is caused by an increase of the atmospher-
ic concentration of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (CH4 and N2O)
in the atmosphere, and at the same time, a decline in the net
negative forcing caused by aerosols. The latter is largely due to
assumed gradually more far-reaching clean-air policies.
In the reference policy pathway and low-emission scenarios,
the CO2-equivalent concentrations add roughly 100, respec-
tively 50 ppm to the CO2 concentrations by 2100, due to strong
reduction measures in non-CO2 greenhouse gases (and the
more potent forcing of CO2 at lower concentration levels).
There is no significant difference between the amount non-CO2
forcings add around 2100 compared to the time of peaking
(2060 for 450 and 2080 for 550 scenarios)
Note the high peak in concentrations in Fig. 2d for the
LimBio-HST scenario is an artifact of sampling: starting from the
high 2030 emission levels, only threemodelswere able to realize
a 450 ppm consistent CO2 budget with limitations on Biomass-
CCS,which by coincidence havemuch higher non-CO2 emissions
that lead to a high and early peak. This atypical behavior
explained by limited sample size does not occur for the CO2
concentration pathways of the LimBio cases in Fig. 1d.
3.3. Surface-air temperature change
The increase in global-mean surface-air temperature is
most often linked to overviews of impacts, such as provided
by IPCC's 4th assessment report, as well as long-term policy
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Fig. 2. As in Fig. 1 for CO2-equivalent concentration projections resulting from IAM emission scenarios as calculated with MAGICC6. Note different y-axis in panel a).
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Cancun Agreements [22]. In addition to long-term tempera-
ture levels, it can be useful to look at the peak warming level
during the 21st century. The reason is that it is not well
known whether temporarily exceeding temperature targets
would lead to (irreversible) impacts or feedbacks, which implies
there is a risk of this being the case.
Both the baseline and reference policy scenarios lead tomuch
higher warming than the 2 °C limit (Fig. 3). It is also important
to note that in these scenarios global mean temperature would
still be increasing by 2100. By contrast, the 550 scenarios lead
to stabilizing of temperatures by 2100—most likely above 2 °C,
while the 450 scenarios on average peak around 2 °C and
embark on a gradual decline by the 2070s. The scenarios that
impose limited potential for global net-negative CO2 emissions
through biomass-energy combined with carbon capture and
storage form an exception here (see further).
Again, themitigation scenarios that assume a staged accession
or delayed action resulting in high short-term emission levels
make a larger difference for the 450 ppm long-term target.
Warming is structurally higher for the 450 staged accession
variant (Fig. 3b) and is also higher throughout the whole
21st century for the high short-term emission level delayed
action variant (Fig. 3d) compared to the immediate action
and optimal scenarios, leading to warming above, rather
than below 2 °C.
While Fig. 3 shows for each scenario themedian projections
and spread of results across all IAMs, individual IAMs produced
a diverse set of time-dependent emission pathways, even for
the delayed action scenarios that were designed to constrain
the IAMs to comparable emission budgets. As an illustra-
tion of the diversity across IAMs, Fig. 4 shows individualmedian warming projections for each individual IAM
emission scenario for the optimal 450 and 550 ppm CO2eq
scenarios.
For both scenarios, nearly all individual IAM results show
comparable behavior, withmedianwarming pathways staying
within the overall 66% uncertainty range. The GCAM model
results deviate from the results of other models as they have a
distinct pattern of rapid increases before a peak warming
around the 2070s, followed by a rapid decline. This is driven by
the model's relatively large potential for net-negative global
CO2 emissions (and thus the large potential for delaying emission
reduction in the short-term), reaching 4 times the all-model
average by 2100. As a result, the GCAM result for the 450
scenario venture deeply into “550 territory”, in the sense that
peak warming in the 450 scenario exceeds peak warming in a
550 realization of most other IAMs.
A further observation is that not all individual IAM
scenarios lead to stabilization in the 550 case and a warming
decline in the 450 case. For IMACLIM and POLES the decline
in CO2 concentrations by 2100 (not shown) that appears in
the overall median (Fig. 1c and d) is absent, or too small to
lead to the warming stabilization, or decline seen for other
IAMs.
To further explore uncertainties related to climate-system
response, we compare in Fig. 5 the MAGICC6 results with our
second method of deriving projections of surface-air tem-
perature change resulting from our emission scenarios. The
results need to be interpreted with care. The GCM step response
functions generally lead to stronger warming, which can largely
be explained by the GCMs represented in the step-response
method, which form a subset of the full CMIP5 collection (see
Supplementary information).
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Fig. 3. As in Fig. 1 for projections of global-mean surface-air temperature change relative to pre-industrial resulting from IAM emission scenarios as calculated
with MAGICC6. Note different y-axis in panel a).
263M. Schaeffer et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 257–2683.4. Rate of warming
For human and natural systems to adapt to global warming,
also the rate of temperature increase can be a crucial factor. In
the past, different rates of maximum temperature increase
have been suggested as a guardrail to prevent ‘unacceptable’
climate impacts (in the order of 0.1–0.2 °C per decade, for
instance [24]). Fig. 6 shows the rate of warming defined by
linear trends over 21 years centered around the year in
question, expressed in temperature change per decade. This is
very close to the change between the average temperatures2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
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Both baselines and reference policy scenarios lead to decadal
warming rates in the order of 0.3 to even 0.5 °C/decade
throughout the century. While the optimal 450 scenarios lead
to maximum rates of warming close to 0.2 °C and rapidly
reducing these, the optimal 550 scenario leads to a warming
structurally faster than the 450 scenario by some0.05 °C/decade,
which implies a structurally larger challenge to adaptation in the
550 scenarios. Thewarming rates estimated by the step function
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comparable between the methods. However, the step-function
method seems somewhat more sensitive to near-term changes
in radiative forcing, so that staged accession carries a larger
‘climate penalty’ – in terms of higher near-term warming –
compared to immediate action scenarios.
Interestingly, while for the overall temperature change so
far we only observed relatively small differences between the2000 2050 2100
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Fig. 6. As in Fig. 1 for projections of rate of change in global-mean surface-air temp
Note different y-axis in panel a).variants consistent with 450 and 550 ppm CO2eq, for the
decadal rate significant differences can be observed. The
effect of staged accession and delayed action is very strong
around 2040, leading to a rate ofwarming higher by 50% for the
450 scenarios. This difference is driven primarily by higher CH4
emissions around 2030 (as the climate policieswould still have
to be introduced). The impact is also noticeable for the limited
biomass-CCS scenario.2000 2050 2100
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erature resulting from IAM emission scenarios as calculated with MAGICC6.
Table 2
Maximum decadal rate of warming over 2020–2080 (°C/decade).
IAM scenario MAGICC6 GCM step-response functions
Base-FullTech-OPT 0.50 0.48
WP3 baseline 0.48 0.45
Reference policy 0.33 0.34
550 immediate action 0.31 0.29
550 staged accession 0.31 0.33
450 immediate action 0.26 0.25
450 staged accession 0.28 0.30
550-FullTech-OPT 0.28 0.29
550-FullTech-HST 0.30 0.30
550-FullTech-LST 0.27 0.29
450-FullTech-OPT 0.26 0.24
450-FullTech-HST 0.30 0.28
450-FullTech-LST 0.27 0.26
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century
Given the prominence that the long-term goals of 1.5 an
2 °C have achieved in the policy debate it is important to note
again the large uncertainties involved in calculating back
these goals to emission trajectories (e.g. [25]). Fig. 7 shows
the probability of exceeding 2 °C over time as calculated with
MAGICC6.
For baselines and reference policy scenario, warming is
likely (N66% probability) to exceed 2 °C by 2050 and very
likely (N90%) by 2060. The 550 scenarios manage to postpone
the moment 2 °C is likely to be exceeded by only a decade. By
contrast, the 450 scenarios are not likely to exceed 2 °C at any
time. However, the 450 staged accession scenario leads to a
peak probability to exceed 2 °C of 66%, which is 1.5 times more
likely than for the 450 immediate action scenario. Although the
limited biomass-CCS scenarios reach probabilities comparable to
the other 450 scenarios, they do not peak and keep increasing
through 2100.
The 550 scenarios are likely to exceed 2 °C and have a
lower probability of 40–50% to exceed 2.5 °C by 2100 (not
shown). Even a level as high as 3 °C, however, is still likely to
be exceeded for the reference scenario and very likely for the
baselines.
It is important to note that although the mean of the
optimal 450 scenarios across all IAMs is not likely to exceed
2 °C, the probability to exceed 2 °C is still roughly 45%, which
means there is only a 55% probability to hold warming below
2 °C. This is only a median likelihood, or a chance of “as likely
above as below” to stay below the 2 °C long-term goal. For a
“likely” chance to hold warming below 2 °C, the probability
should be 66% or higher, i.e. the probability to exceed 2 °C
should be lower than 33%. Here again the diversity among
IAM emission pathways is important to emphasize. Fig. 8a
shows 2 °C exceeding probabilities for the 450 immediate action
scenario for individual IAMs. Of the 8 models that covered the
whole of the 21st century, five achieved an exceeding probability
around 33%, while all four mid-term IAMs that estimate
emissions to 2050 only show behavior typical of the five
low-exceeding longer-term probability scenarios. This im-
plies that the majority of IAM scenarios provide optimal 450
pathways with a likely chance of holding warming below2 °C. Fig. 8b shows that staged accession has the largest impact
on exactly these scenarios, by increasing the probability to
exceed 2 °C up to 3 times. On the other hand, these estimates
are sensitive to the probability distribution of climate sensitiv-
ity in the MAGICC6 setup. The greenhouse-gas concentration
region aroundwhich exceeding probability is most sensitive to
small changes in concentrations might well shift for a different
estimate of the climate sensitivity's most likely value and other
characteristics like skewness andwidth of the distribution [26].
4. Discussion
In all mitigation scenarios assessed in this paper, mitiga-
tion efforts are effective in reducing concentrations, radiative
forcing and warming in the mid- and long-term. The scenario
variants that assume higher 2030 emission levels than the
optimal scenarios carry some level of climate “penalty” in
terms of higher mid- to long-term warming, with the largest
effect on the 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios. The 450 scenarios
have a reasonable probability of larger than 50% to limit
warming to 2 °C over the 21st century and are generally on a
downward temperature trajectory by 2100. By contrast, the
optimal 550 ppm CO2eq scenarios reach emission levels by
2030 that are not very different from the weak policy/delay
scenarios. We find thus that the delay scenarios, which
approximate the policy stringency from the present internation-
al negotiations (pledges) to be rather consistentwith a 550 ppm
CO2e target. These scenarios are all associated with a probability
of around 80% to exceed 2 °C within the 21st century, and all
reach a much higher median estimate of warming of roughly
2.5 °C above pre-industrial by 2100. In addition, our reference
policy scenario that is also linked to current policies leads to a
medianwarming estimate of over 3 °C by 2100.We thus find the
currently proposed stringency of emission reductions to be
incompatible with the long-term objective of keeping global
warming below the stated objective of 2 °C.
Within the range of 450 scenario variants, we observe
several key differences that root back in the scenario design
and the main research questions that they aim to address.
Conclusions for the delayed action scenarios differ thus from
the ones that we can draw from the staged accession scenarios.
The delayed action scenarios aim at exploring implications of
different 2030 emission levels to reach specific long-term targets.
By definition, all scenarios are thus constrained with the same
21st century CO2 emission budget to reach comparable level of
concentrations, radiative forcing and warming in the long term
by 2100. In this set-up, the 2030 emission target represents a
perturbation of the transient pathway towards a long-term
objective. Our conclusions from the “delayed action” scenarios
focus thus on the transient effects and impliedmid-term climate
“penalties” that may arise due to suboptimal timing of policies.
Given the pre-defined emission budgets, emissions by 2030 at a
level of the high targets (HST) need to be compensated by more
rapid and deeper emission reductions after 2030 compared to
scenarios intersecting lower 2030 levels. While Riahi et al. [9] in
this issue find that this has significant adverse effects for costs
and feasibility of the transformation,we find in addition also that
the delayed action scenarios carry a penalty onmid-term climate
change, which is expressed most starkly by an up to 50% higher
rate of warming around the 2040s, compared to the optimal
scenarios. Earlier single-model studies showed a comparable
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Fig. 7. As in Fig. 1 for estimates of the probability for global-mean surface-air temperature change to exceed 2 °C above pre-industrial resulting from IAM emission
scenarios as calculated with MAGICC6.
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A highermid-term rate of warmingmay pose a challenge for the
required adaptation needs and under inadequate adaptation
would increase damage costs from climate change. Overshoot is
also a problem for CO2 concentration, which, for example, in
the staged-accession scenarios approaches 500 ppm for multiple
decades, before dropping almost down to 450 ppmby the end of
the century. Ocean acidification has been projected to lead to2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
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Fig. 8. Estimates of the probability for global-mean surface-air temperature change
scenarios as calculated with MAGICC6 for the 450 immediate action (a) and 450 sta
all MAGICC6 ensemble members for all IAM emission realizations.coral reefs stopping to grow above around 450 ppm CO2 and
even start to dissolve above around 550 ppm, so that an
overshoot of CO2 concentration brings the risk of severe
damage to coral reefs, irrespective of the effects of warming
that lead to more frequent coral-bleaching events [27,28].
In contrast to our delayed action scenarios, our second
type of scenarios on staged accession did not constrain the
long-term emissions and instead explored the consequences2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
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to exceed 2 °C above pre-industrial resulting from individual IAM emission
ged accession (b) scenarios. The bold line indicates the overall median across
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pathway, starting from a 2030 emission level considerably
higher. Hence, the “penalty” on energy-economics in these
scenarios is limited and the emphasis is shifted instead towards
a penalty on climate. Note however, that these scenarios by
no means represent a weak climate policy case: still strong
mitigation efforts result from a carbon price signal that does
not adapt to the fact of delay, but is motivated by ambitious
climate policy objectives. Nonetheless, in these staged accession
cases, bothmid- and long-term climate projections are affected
significantly compared to the immediate action 450 scenarios,
with a “best-guess” (median) warming peak of 2.2 °C, rather
than 1.9 °C above pre-industrial, a 50% higher rate of warming
around the 2040s, and a probability to exceed 2 °C over the
21st century about 50% higher (increasing on average from
roughly 45% to 65%).
5. Conclusions
Peak and decline behavior is a prominent feature of stringent
mitigation pathways. Here, we applied two methods of
projecting future warming; one method using a Monte-Carlo
simulation of carbon cycle and simple climate model and a
second method of emulating the response of complex General
Circulation climate Models. Both methods show clearly that
near- and long-term warming are significantly increased by
delayed action to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions compared
to immediate action. Estimates of the probability that warming
exceeds 2 °C above pre-industrial respond strongly to peak and
decline pathways.
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